Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model

摘要: Abstract In this paper, we extend the Jain-Mirman [Jain, N., & Mirman, L. (2000). Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals. Economic Theory, 16 , 333–353, Jain, (2002). Effects under different market structures. The Quarterly Review Economics Finance, 42 19–39] Daher-Mirman [Daher, W., (2006). Cournot duopoly two insiders. 46 530–551, Daher, (2007). Market structure trading. International 306–331] papers on competition, postulate that competition among insiders in be Stackelberg. However, an owner high organizational hierarchy, who designs manager compensation mechanisms chooses a to serve his purpose, should have information manager's reaction act as Stackelberg leader sector. We show owner's profit can definitely enlarged while profits may decrease or increase depending variances sectors, which are exogenous parameters.