Justification, Reasons and Truth

作者: Ian Paul Schnee

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摘要: Two natural ideas we have about justification are that justified by basing our beliefs on good reasons, rather than wishful thinking or blind prejudice, and makes objectively likely to be true. Despite their appeal, respecting both of these is impossible if think one's reasons for belief determined entirely psychological states, such as experiences, not how the world around one. If isolated from world, it seems they could make true.This why debate between epistemic internalists, who just states believer, externalists, deny this, so intractable. Internalists motivated intuition subject's belief, whereas externalists true.I argue key resolving this dispute reject view in favor facts - including We can then accept idea a matter On (the us) The result theory captures motivations traditional forms internalism externalism, while avoiding characteristic problems those views face.

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