The Moral Relevance of Past Preferences

作者: Krister Bykvist

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3530-8_9

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摘要: Preference utilitarians think that our most fundamental goal is to make sure people get what they want. Many objections have been raised against this exclusive focus on preference satisfaction. One particularly damaging objection seems be in their pursuit of overall satisfaction take into account past preferences.1 But satisfy all desires unreasonable, especially if replaced by new ones. Richard Brandt even goes so far as suggest problem shows a morally relevant concept desire-satisfaction unintelligible.2 In paper, I am going show can answer objection. particular, we avoid the preferences without adopting time-partial standpoint according which should excluded just because are past. This result interest not but preference-sensitive theorists, i.e., who claim some moral importance. So, for instance, you one important promote people’s happiness, and happiness matter feeling satisfied also successfully pursuing one’s lifetime ambitions, or live accordance with plan life, then will face preferences. For decide do when change minds form ambitions.

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