Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis

作者: Yoram Bachrach , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein , Aviv Zohar , Yoad Lewenberg , Yonatan Sompolinsky

DOI: 10.5555/2772879.2773270

关键词:

摘要: Bitcoin is an innovative decentralized cryptocurrency whose core security relies on a "proof of work" procedure, which requires network participants to repeatedly compute hashes inputs from large search space. Finding one the rare that generates extremely low hash value considered successful attempt, allowing miners approve new transactions and, in return, collect rewards bitcoins.This reward allocation, provides incentive for participate, random process with variance. Miners who desire steady income thus often participate mining pools divide among their members earned rewards, and reduce this Mining are slightly better at coordinating due lower-latency communication, fact implies they manage higher rewards.We examine dynamics pooled collect, use cooperative game theoretic tools analyze how pool may share these rewards. We show some parameters, especially under high transaction loads, it difficult or even impossible distribute stable way: always incentivized switch between pools.

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