Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

作者: Satoshi Fukuda

DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.007

关键词:

摘要: Abstract This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they believe logical consequences of The key idea is to use a novel concept basis: it an event such that, whenever true, every player believes its consequences. in obtains when basis implies the mutual that event. If players' beliefs are assumed then reduces knowledge. formalization nests previous axiomatizations and knowledge which have monotonic reasoning. Under this formalization, unlike others, if rationality actions survive iterated elimination strictly dominated even monotonic.

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