The extended Condorcet condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of majority decision
作者： V. J. Bowman , C. S. Colantoni
DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.1972.9989818
关键词:
摘要: This paper presents a synthesis of the necessary and sufficient restrictions that insure transitive group preference if majority rule is aggregation procedure. We show equivalence between transitivity an extension condition Condorcet which states alternative receives over every other, then it should be social choice. equivalent to finding solution system linear inequalities. use these inequalities demonstrate recent work on voter preferences can derived from this Extended Condition.
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