Compromise Reaching Mechanisms in Multi-Group/Multi-Player Negotiation Processes

摘要: We consider a situation in which multiple decision-makers who are partitionedinto two or more distinct groups asked to recommend uniform course ofaction is drawn from finite and explicit set of potential alternatives.We present group-level player-level mechanisms reach compromisedecision under such circumstances. The mechanism based onthe Dempster-Shafer theory evidence; employsa set-product operation that aggregates the individual decisions over certainspace committees. Previous research established areisomorphic, which, contest paper, implies they yieldthe same compromise decision. However, unlike theory,which was criticized for lack external validity, mechanismhas plausible properties group decision making. With inmind, paper seeks (i) report about an interesting relationship betweengroup AI methods manage uncertainty, (ii) builda foundation inter-disciplinary exploits this linkage.