Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems

作者: Yuanzhong Xu , Weidong Cui , Marcus Peinado

DOI: 10.1109/SP.2015.45

关键词:

摘要: The presence of large numbers security vulnerabilities in popular feature-rich commodity operating systems has inspired a long line work on excluding these from the trusted computing base applications, while retaining many their benefits. Legacy applications continue to run untrusted system, small hyper visor or hardware prevents system accessing applications' memory. In this paper, we introduce controlled-channel attacks, new type side-channel attack that allows an extract amounts sensitive information protected like Overshadow, Ink Tag Haven. We implement attacks Haven and demonstrate power by extracting complete text documents outlines JPEG images widely deployed application libraries. Given it is unclear if Over shadow's vision protecting unmodified legacy running off-the-shelf still tenable.

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