Perception, Particulars and Predicates

作者: Kevin Mulligan

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5_8

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摘要: What sort of an episode is perception? are the objects such episodes? grammatical and logical form perceptual reports, direct indirect? Each these questions has been subject recent discussion. In what follows I set out one answer to each them explore some ways answers support complement other. The adopted are: perceive — shall normally only have in mind visual perception not judge or conceptualize but a sui generis mental mode activity involving non-conceptual content; particulars only; complements verbs are, with exception, non-propositional indirect reports made true by relations between subjects various sorts.

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