Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

作者: Wolfgang C. Müller , Kaare Strom , Torbjörn Bergman

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摘要: Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced bypoliticians and especially by the scholarly communitybut remains less understood. In this essay, Iidentify institutional features that defineparliamentary suggest how they can beunderstood as delegation relationships. I proposetwo definitions: one minimal maximal (orideal-typical). latter sense, parliamentarydemocracy is a particular regime of andaccountability be understood with help ofagency theory, which allows us to identify theconditions under democratic agency problems mayoccur. Parliamentarism simple, indirect, andrelies on lessons gradually acquired in past. Compared presidentialism, parliamentarism hascertain advantages, such decisional efficiency andthe inducements it creates toward effort. On theother hand, also implies disadvantagessuch ineffective accountability lack oftransparency, may cause informationalinefficiencies. And whereas beparticularly suitable for adverseselection, certain cure moral hazard.In contemporary advanced societies, isfacing challenges decaying screening devicesand diverted accountabilities