Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma:

作者: Robert Axelrod

DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400101

关键词:

摘要: This is a “primer” on how to play the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game effectively. Existing research approaches offer participant limited help in understanding cope effectively with such interactions. To gain deeper of be effective partially competitive and cooperative environment, computer tournament was conducted for Dilemma. Decision rules were submitted by entrants who recruited primarily from experts theory variety disciplines: psychology, political science, economics, sociology, mathematics. The results demonstrate that there are subtle reasons an individualistic pragmatist cooperate as long other side does, somewhat for-giving, optimistic about side's responsiveness.

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