作者: Yossi Gilad , Amir Herzberg
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31680-7_6
关键词:
摘要: We show how to exploit side-channels identify clients without eavesdropping on the communication server, and relying known, distinguishable traffic patterns. present different attacks, utilizing side-channels, for two scenarios: a fully off-path attack detecting TCP connections, an Tor connections by only clients. Our attacks three types of side channels: globally-incrementing IP identifiers, used some operating systems, e.g., in Windows; packet processing delays, which depend state; bogus-congestion events, causing impact TCP's throughput (via congestion control mechanism). Our can (optionally) also benefit from sequential port allocation, deployed Windows Linux. The are practical - we results experiments all network environments scenarios. countermeasures these attacks.