The Politics of Oil Nationalizations

摘要: This dissertation is about the institutional choices governments make to manage their petroleum wealth. It determinants of these choices, but more importantly, consequences for effective governance and how they explain variations in political outcomes oil-producing countries. I begin by describing several different pathways -- involving national oil companies (NOCs) varying characteristics that can take extracting regulating its production. My goal, then, show seemingly technical have profound impacts on governance, ranging from effects state revenue collection incentives corruption ultimately survival regime itself. To this aim, collected original longitudinal data formation NOCs 62 countries since 1900; U.S. Department Justice transcripts prosecution corrupt practices energy sectors 80 2006-12 period; existing cross-national government capture sale natural resources. analyze NOC first empirical chapter, where use Bayesian analysis informed with interview-based consultants test confirm leading theories revenue-maximization as primary determinant expropriation. In following process extortion sector cross-nationally design influences bribery high-level officials. penultimate expand showing nationalization increases resource revenues, creating stability duration. last discuss theoretical implications my argument findings. two broad claims dissertation. First, while there much agreement not always everywhere a curse development, little consensus specific conditions or institutions do matter. help turn ``institutions matter'' phrase vague stylized fact into well-measured, clearly-specified phenomenon. Second, when it comes production resources, classical economics would suggest intervention will lead inefficiency, lower outputs therefore revenues. contrast, argue evidence some forms is, certain types actually increase both levels revenues compared periods no intervention. Taken together, applies novel ways measure oil's conditional politics are widely circulated often assumed rather than tested.