Financial intermediary-coalitions

作者: John H Boyd , Edward C Prescott

DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8

关键词:

摘要: … -coalitions arise to … coalitions have access to a contracting technology which can preclude subsequent recontracting. Second, we assume that agents cannot be excluded from coalitions …

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