作者: Andrey Bogdanov , Donghoon Chang , Mohona Ghosh , Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15943-0_10
关键词:
摘要: In this paper, we re-evaluate the security-bound of full round AES against biclique attack. Under some reasonable restrictions, exhaustively analyze most promising class cryptanalysis as applied to through a computer-assisted search and find optimal attacks towards lowest computational data complexities: Among with minimal complexity unicity distance, ones \(2^{126.67}\) (for AES-128), \(2^{190.9}\) AES-192) \(2^{255}\) AES-256) are fastest. Each attack just requires 2 AES-128 or 3 known plaintexts for success probability 1. We obtain these results using improved proposed in Crypto’13. Among less than codebook, AES-128, \(2^{126.16}\) Within these, one \(2^{64}\) smallest amount data. Thus, original (with \(2^{88}\)) did not have AES-128. Similar findings observed AES-192 well (data \(2^{48}\) \(2^{80}\) attack). For AES-256, an that has lower \(2^{254.31}\) compared \(2^{254.42}\). Among all covered, \(2^{125.56}\) \(2^{189.51}\) \(2^{253.87}\) fastest, though requiring codebook. This can be considered indication limitations independent approach AES.