作者: Christophe Giraud , Erik W. Knudsen , Michael Tunstall
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_12
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摘要: At ACISP 2004, Giraud and Knudsen presented the first fault analysis of DSA, ECDSA, XTR-DSA, Schnorr ElGamal signatures schemes that considered faults affecting one byte. They showed 2304 faulty would be expected to reduce number possible keys 240, allowing a 160-bit private key recovered. In this paper we show Knudsen's attack is much more efficient than originally claimed. We prove 34.3% less are required recover using same model. also their original way expressing model under system equations can improved. A precise expression allows us obtain another improvement up 47.1%, depending on values byte affected.