Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism

作者: Doron Almog

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摘要: In early 2003 an Israeli agent in the Gaza Strip telephoned Mustafa, a wealthy Palestinian merchant Gaza, to inform him that over previous three months his son Ahmad had been preparing for suicide bombing mission Israel. Mustafa was told if followed through with plans, he and family would suffer severe consequences: their home be demolished, Israel cut off all commercial ties Mustafa's company. Neither nor members of ever permitted enter again. (1) Faced this ultimatum, confronted convinced cost far outweigh any possible benefits sacrifice might have people. Since start second intifada September 2000, authorities prevented more than 340 bombings from advancing beyond planning stages. addition, they intercepted 142 would-be bombers, most whom were en route destinations deep within (2) The war against terrorism, like on terrorism broadly, aims prevent terrorists, including achieving objectives. Suicide bombers are sophisticated smart bombs devised. They well integrated into communities, mobile, often can choose best moment which wreak greatest havoc produce highest number casualties. Yet as case illustrates, right mix threats at least some instances challenges conventional wisdom undeterrable. repeatedly demonstrated deadly efficiency, United States its friends allies confront similar those has dealt years. To meet these challenges, other opponents will need strategy effectively address threat. Classical deterrence theory, emerged after World War II buildup nuclear arsenals Soviet Union subsequent concern possibility total annihilation, is inapplicable terrorism. Cold divided world two opposing camps. Union, enough destructive power wipe out humanity several times over, relied burgeoning maintain peace between them. literature classical inspired by typically characterizes deterrent threat posed dichotomy: successful so long price launching mutual assured destruction. Although deterrence, articulated practiced during War, did not conflicts such Korean Vietnam, neither or resort use weapons bring them end. situations, however, logic theory proved hugely irrelevant. One particularly notable Arab-Israeli conflict. Following defeat full-scale wars 1948, 1956, 1967, Israel's committed enemies responded gradually shifting main objective destruction limited achieve Another effect defeats (including 1973) noticeable increase moderation among Arab leaders, Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat, Syria's Hafiz al-Assad, Jordan's King Hussein, even leader Yasser Arafat vis-a-vis neighbor. A significant exception usefulness current global no relevance 19 al Qaeda operatives who took control four jetliners 11 2001, slamming Trade Center third Pentagon. …

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