作者: Debasis Mitra , Abhinav Sridhar
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摘要: The formation of consortiums a broadband access Internet Service Provider (ISP) and multiple Content Providers (CP) is considered for large-scale content caching. consortium members share costs from operations investments in the supporting infrastructure. Correspondingly, model's cost function includes marginal fixed costs; latter has been important determining industry structure. Also, if Net Neutrality regulations permit, additional network capacity on ISP's last mile may be contracted by CPs. number subscribers determined combination users' price elasticity demand Quality Experience. profit generated coalition after pricing design optimization determines game's characteristic function. Coalition bargaining procedure due to Okada (1996) based random proposers non-cooperative, multi-player game-theoretic framework. A necessary sufficient condition obtained Grand form, which bounds subsidies large small contributors. Caching generally supported even under regulations. Coalition's matches upper bounds. Numerical results illustrate analytic results.