The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands
作者： Chi Kin Chau , Kwang Mong Sim
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6377(03)00030-0
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摘要: By showing that there is an upper bound for the price of [email protected](@C) a non-atomic congestion game @C with only separable cost maps and fixed demands, Roughgarden Tardos show forgoing centralized control mild. This letter shows @r(@C) in demands symmetric maps. It also weaker elastic demands.
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