Examining Monotonicity and Saliency Using Level-k Reasoning in a Voting Game

摘要: This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. by Nagel (1) postulates players might be different types, each corresponding to level which they engage. Furthermore, postulate on subjects' choice, used Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) In QRE, players' decisions are noisy, with probability playing given strategy increasing its expected payoff. Hence, choice is function magnitude incentives. Our results show low promotes highest degree strategic every payment treatment. Standard enough induce equilibrium behavior, marginal extra behavior seems negligible. High complexity, instead, decreases rate convergence play. With sufficiently high payoff amounts does promote more significant manner. complex games, higher required for subjects exert effort needed complete task.