Attacking the BitLocker Boot Process

作者: Sven Türpe , Andreas Poller , Jan Steffan , Jan-Peter Stotz , Jan Trukenmüller

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00587-9_12

关键词:

摘要: We discuss five attack strategies against BitLocker, which target the way BitLocker is using TPM sealing mechanism. a disk encryption feature included in some versions of Microsoft Windows. It represents state-of-the-art design, enhanced with support for improved security. show that, under certain assumptions, dedicated attacker can circumvent protection and break confidentiality limited effort. Our attacks neither exploit vulnerabilities itself nor do they directly TPM. They rather sequences actions that Trusted Computing fails to prevent, demonstrating limitations technology.

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