Agency discretion and the dynamics of procedural reform

摘要: It is axiomatic that important policy decisions are made in the administrative process, governmental and nongovernmental actors have a large stake they try to influence it. One way politicians courts agency making by imposing procedural requirements on decision process--requirements designed benefit favored interest groups. While there considerable disagreement among scholars over effectiveness of these attempts use procedures "stack deck" favor certain constituents, relatively little empirical data been brought debate. In this article I examine succession Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) hydro licensing program, agency's response those reforms. The analysis produced three central conclusions. First, FERC responded each reforms ways limited or avoided kinds changes were elicit. Second, responses environmental group access decisionmaking process. Third, despite first two conclusions, behavior remained consistent with (1) its substantive (i.e., nonprocedural) statutory mandates, (2) view avoiding cumbersome new would facilitate fulfillment mandates. Interest Groups, Procedures, Agency Decisions debate purposes their effects decision-making processes has persisted for decades, continues evolve interesting directions. Some prescribed as antidote an process see closed, arbitrary, too responsive business interests, not enough public at (Lowi, 1979; Stewart, 1978). This arose to: "capture" theories describe how regulatory agencies become captives interests time (Bernstein, 1955; Ferejohn, 1987; Kolko, 1966); other stressing resource disadvantages collective action problems impede ability large, diffuse participate leaving established (Olson, 1965; Schattschneider, 1960). By 1960s, concern probusiness bias had spread from academic judicial circles (Melnick, 1983). At prodding lobbyists, began pry open 1960s 1970s interpreting Administrative Procedures Act (APA) require expanded participation rights underrepresented For part, Congress supplemented effort additional agencies. Not surprisingly, some celebrated movement toward increased rigor general, rule particular, make fairer more democratic (for example, Davis, 1969). Other scholars, many them positive political theorists, took slightly different procedures, portraying Congress's imposition tool control former latter. According view, makes about tandem environment exert ex ante(1) future decisions. way, enable groups members winning legislative coalition enforce bargain stage (McCubbins, Noll, Weingast, 1988). …