Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks

作者: Allen N. Berger , Nathan H. Miller , Mitchell A. Petersen , Raghuram G. Rajan , Jeremy C. Stein

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.294660

关键词:

摘要: Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large in activities require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea context bank lending to firms, an activity is typically thought as relying heavily find banks are less willing lend informationally "difficult" credits, such firms not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for endogeneity bank-firm matching, at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and exclusive relationships, alleviate credit constraints effectively. All consistent being able collect act information banks.

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