Corporate Raiders and their Disciplinary Role in the Market for Corporate Control
作者： James P. Walsh , Rita D. Kosnik
DOI: 10.5465/256755
关键词:
摘要: Little research examines the supposed disciplinary effect of market for corporate control on entrenched and ineffective management teams. Our analysis relationships between firm performa...
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