Deterring Strategic Cyberattack

作者: David Elliott

DOI: 10.1109/MSP.2011.24

关键词:

摘要: Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks by other nations is a matter of considerable concern. Can deterrence play role in such protection? lessons nuclear deterrence-the most elaborated and successful version deterrence-be adapted to the cyber case? Currently, little overlap exists between two, although that might change aftermath an extensive, destructive cyberattack. The effective way protect cyber-dependent comprehensive defense (deterrence denial), which was impractical regime. However, this approach presents challenges. Existing legal norms, particularly those related controlling collateral damage, provide some deterrence. Another option be new international agreement, but would involve several difficult issues.

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Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, Stuart H. Starr, Cyberpower and National Security ,(2009)
Peter L. Levin, Wesley K. Clark, Securing the Information Highway Foreign Affairs. ,(2009)
David Elliott, Weighing the Case For a Convention to Limit Cyberwarfare Arms Control Today. ,(2009)