Bargaining in Weighted Majority Voting Games
作者： Norman Schofield
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_2
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摘要: An important consideration in analyzing the stability of multiparty coalition governments is modelling bargaining process between parties. This chapter considers a theory, known as set, which gives payoff predictions for coalitions transferable value case. A proof existence called B* presented. As an illustration it shown that Denmark after 1957 election, provides superior prediction Gamsom proportionality prediction.
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