Modelling the Provision of Industrial Development Incentives

作者: Paul Peretz

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-08891-1_11

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摘要: In recent years there has been a remarkable expansion in the number of industrial development incentives offered by American states. The states offering seven or more ten most valued firms increased from three 1966 to thirty-six 1983 (Peretz, 1986). This occured despite general consensus among analysts that such have only marginal effects on firms’ decisions and they serve primarily as subsidy industry. this chapter, will be examined order show both why offer location are generally contrary public interest.

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