Endogenous mergers and size asymmetry of merger participants
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00082-2
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摘要: Abstract This note presents a simple model highlighting the basic economic intuition about relationship between initial market concentration and size asymmetry of merger participants. Merger participants are endogenously determined. The main result shows that negative relation should be expected.
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