ORDEAL MECHANISMS IN TARGETING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN INDONESIA

摘要: Economic theory suggests that, when designing aid programs, ordeal mechanisms that impose differential costs for rich and poor can induce self-selection hence improve targeting ("self-targeting"). We first re-examine this show may actually have theoretically ambiguous effects on targeting: example, time spent applying imposes a higher monetary cost the rich, but utility poor. then examine these issues empirically by conducting 400-village field experiment within Indonesia's Conditional Cash Transfer program. Targeting in program is usually conducted automatically enrolling candidates who pass an asset test. compare whether instituting mechanism, where villagers come to central application site apply take test, improves over existing automatic enrollment system. Within self-targeting villages, we find are more likely apply, even conditional they would On net, villages much poorer group of beneficiaries than status quo villages. However, marginally increasing does not necessarily while experimentally distance reduces number applicants, it screens out both roughly equal proportions. Estimating model structurally, only one need increase dramatically (e.g. tripling wait times 9 hours or more) detectable additional selection. In short, self-selection, applicants without improving targeting.