Truthful fair division without free disposal.

作者: Warut Suksompong , Xiaohui Bei , Guangda Huzhang

DOI: 10.1007/S00355-020-01256-0

关键词:

摘要: … In particular, we show that for both cake cutting and chore division, no truthful and envy-free mechanism attains a better efficiency ratio than the mechanisms we presented in Sect. 3. …

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