Timing attacks on Web privacy

作者: Edward W. Felten , Michael A. Schneider

DOI: 10.1145/352600.352606

关键词:

摘要: We describe a class of attacks that can compromise the privacy users’ Web-browsing histories. The allow malicious Web site to determine whether or not user has recently visited some other, unrelated page. page this information by measuring time user’s browser requires perform certain operations. Since browsers various forms caching, required for operations depends on browsing history; paper shows resulting variations convey enough privacy. This attack method also allows other types gathering sites, such as more invasive form “cookies”. we be carried out without victim’s knowledge, and most “anonymous browsing” tools fail prevent them. Other simple countermeasures these attacks. way reengineering

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