The Optimal Level of Deductibility in Insurance Contracts

作者: Harris Schlesinger

DOI: 10.2307/252724

关键词:

摘要: This paper examines the choice of an insurance contract when is deductible type. optimal shown to be directly related insured's degree risk aversion. Under certain assumptions, it that individual with a higher loss probability, aversion, or lower level initial wealth will purchase more insurance. Conditions for full coverage no are also examined.

参考文章(12)
Harris Schlesinger, Deductible Insurance and Nonlinear Pricing University Microfilms International. ,(1980)
Artur Raviv, The design of an optimal insurance policy The American Economic Review. ,vol. 69, pp. 251- 263 ,(1992) , 10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_13
B. Peter Pashigian, Lawrence L. Schkade, George H. Menefee, The Selection of an Optimal Deductible for a Given Insurance Policy The Journal of Business. ,vol. 39, pp. 35- ,(1966) , 10.1086/294829
Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Essays in the theory of risk-bearing ,(1958)
Denis Moffet, Optimal Deductible and Consumption Theory Journal of Risk and Insurance. ,vol. 44, pp. 669- ,(1977) , 10.2307/251727
Vernon L. Smith, Optimal Insurance Coverage Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 76, pp. 68- 77 ,(1968) , 10.1086/259382
Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 76, pp. 118- 133 ,(1968) , 10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_5
Zvi Adar, Seev Neumann, On Optimal Property Insurance Policies The Journal of Risk and Insurance. ,vol. 45, pp. 95- ,(1978) , 10.2307/251810
John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large Econometrica. ,vol. 32, pp. 122- ,(1964) , 10.2307/1912743