Automatically detecting most vulnerabilities in cryptographic protocols

作者: S.H. Brackin

DOI: 10.1109/DISCEX.2000.824981

关键词:

摘要: The Automatic Authentication Protocol Analyzer, 2nd Version (AAPA2) is a fast, completely automatic tool for formally analyzing cryptographic protocols. It correctly identifies vulnerabilities or their absence in 43 of 51 protocols studied the literature, and it finds errors previously asserted authentication properties two large commercial This paper describes how AAPA2 13 16 vulnerable protocols, which earlier Analyzer (AAPA) only 6 these

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