摘要: A theory is developed to identify, characterize, and explain all possible positional pairwise voting outcomes that can occur for any number of alternatives profile. This paper describes where new results include explanations paradoxes, cycles, conflict between Borda Condorcet rankings, differences among procedures using votes (such as the Count, Kemeny's method, Arrow-Raynaud rule), discrepancies societal rankings candidates are dropped or added. Other relationships “winners” “losers.” The also shows how construct supporting profiles. following companion does same methods.
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