作者: Juan Manuel García Lara , Beatriz García Osma , Fernando Penalva
DOI: 10.1080/09638180701706922
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摘要: Abstract Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997–2002 we find that where CEO has low influence over functioning board directors show greater degree accounting conservatism. We measure using two aggregate indexes combining six (eight) characteristics and its monitoring committees: size, proportion non-executive directors, independent whether chairman is an executive director, number meetings, existence audit committee, nomination/remuneration committee committee. define conservatism as asymmetric recognition speed good bad news in earnings, it following Basu (Journal Accounting Economics, 24, pp. 3–37, 1997) Ball Shivakumar 39, 83–128, 2005). Our results are robust to alternative s...