Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
作者： Ricardo Martínez , Bernardo Moreno
DOI: 10.1007/S10058-013-0149-7
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摘要: We study a problem in which group of voters must decide candidates are elected from set alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations represented by linear orderings. propose family restrictions domain separable preferences. These subdomains generated partition that identifies friends, enemies and unbiased for each voter. characterize social choice functions satisfy strategy-proofness tops-onlyness properties subdomains. find these not accompanied an increase satisfying two properties.
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