作者: Fouad Ben Abdelaziz , José Rui Figueira , Olfa Meddeb
DOI: 10.1016/J.FSS.2007.06.015
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摘要: In many social decision-making contexts, a manipulator has incentives to change the choice in his favor by strategically misrepresenting preference. Gibbard [Manipulation of voting schemes: general result, Econometrica 41(4) (1973) 587-601] and Satterthwaite [Strategy-proofness Arrow's conditions: existence correspondence theorems for procedures welfare functions. J. Econom. Theory 10 (1975) 187-217] have shown that any non-dictatorial procedure is vulnerable strategic manipulation. This paper extends their result case fuzzy weak preference relations. For this purpose, best alternative set defined three ways consequently generalizations Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem context are provided.