On the Concept of the Value of Information in Competitive Situations
作者： Jean-Pierre Ponssard
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摘要: In this paper a game theoretic model is used to extend information value theory, as developed in decision analysis, competitive situations. One of the main differences between and noncompetitive situations that part environment namely competitors may be modified result experimentation another nature. Hence, states world actions no more independent. Nevertheless, we shall show how classical concept generalized cover
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