摘要: Plato describes a world of Ideals, and suggests that our own contains just shadows these perfect forms. This paper finds The Platonic Ideal envisaged in governance regulation is unattainable. Interviews with FTSE 350 remuneration committee members their advisors show the rhetorics disclosure imply conformity, but enacted realities cover wide range practices. Some comply spirit regulation, others leave something to be desired. Governance practice relates behaviour, not structure, behaviours vary widely between companies, ways are obvious an external observer. implies corporate disclosures present incomplete picture practice. Companies interpreting best different variety outcomes. study offers insights companies regulators. growing, process behaviour as easily regulated structures. Boards need alert fact compliance itself does guarantee good governance.
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