Bertrand-Nash mill pricing and the locations of two firms with partially overlapping product selections

摘要: This paper assumes Bertrand-Nash-mill-price competition between two firms on a unit interval, with each firm selling out of three products, and transportation costs that are proportional to distance squared. If c consumers per length desire monopoly product, b the duopoly then equilibrium locations more centralized higher ratio c/b, than socially optimal for c/b above critical value, completely different value. A number variations model also presented. Resumen Este articulo asume la competencia Bertrand-Nash para precios en fabrica entre dos empresas con intervalo de una unidad, que cada empresa vende un total tres productos, y los costos transporte son proporcionales al cuadrado distancia. Si consumidores por unidad longitud desean producto monopolio, el del duopolio, entonces las localizaciones equilibrio ambas estaran mas centralizadas cuanto mayor sea razon socialmente optimas encima valor critico, completamente critico diferente. Se ofrece ademas serie variaciones modelo.