Individual transferable quotas in world fisheries: Addressing legal and rights-based issues

摘要: Abstract Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have reduced overcapacity and increased profitability in many fisheries, sometimes helped to reduce overfishing. ITQs are designed almost entirely on the basis of economic theory, however. This paper assesses from viewpoints four broader analytical frameworks: interactive governance approach (IGA); social-ecological systems (SES) framework; ecosystems fisheries (EAF); legal rights-based paradigm. When viewed these perspectives, seen involve several real potential problems. These problems include concentration ownership loss SSFs; failure make use non-economic modes governance; risk ecological damage overexploitation, unfairness public as owner fish. Nevertheless, ITQ schemes can be modified ways that negative impacts while still retaining structure advantages. describes possible changes: reserving quota share for traditional and/or explicitly imposing a duty stewardship holders; implementing fees or royalties rather than granting free; cooperative regulation. For each proposed change, weaknesses which it addresses identified, effectiveness solution is discussed.