Dissecting Common Ground: Examining an Instance of Reference Repair

摘要: Dissecting Common Ground: Examining an Instance of Reference Repair Timothy Koschmann (tkoschmann@siumed.edu) Curtis LeBaron (lebaron@stripe.colorado.edu) Medical Education, 801 N. Rutledge Springfield, IL 62711 USA Communication Department, Campus Box 270 Boulder, CO Charles Goodwin (cgoodwin@humnet.ucla.edu) Paul Feltovich (pfeltovich@siumed.edu) Applied Linguistics, 3300 Rolfe Hall Los Angeles, CA 90095 Abstract How participants to a joint activity come develop shared or mutual understanding what they are perceiving has long been problematic issue for philosophers, sociologists, and linguists. We examine the abstract model proposed by Clark Marshall (1981) whereby speakers hearers construct knowledge which discrepancies in definite reference repaired. focus particular on forms demonstrative that depend upon physical co- presence. attested example repair operating room teaching hospital. It involves learning recognize pertinent structures within endoscopic surgeries, is surgeries internal spaces rendered visible inserting fiber-optic lens into body patient. provide useful vocabulary discussing referential practices this applied setting. left with some questions about how interpret certain features their model, however. conclude further theoretical framing required before we full appreciation accomplished day-to- day interaction. linguists (cf., Heritage, 19884; Lewis, 1969; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Stalnaker, 1978). One means building common ground (Clark, 1996), course, through reference. Even here, however, potential problems abound. When one issues utterance It’s right it assures oneself presented as here same taken listener? Further, do detect when have arisen these be reconciled? begin paper reviewing pragmatic (1981). then instance setting evaluate usefulness actual practice. Marshall's Model direct references based proposal constructed. This can expressed succinctly following formula: Evidence + Assumptions Induction Schema = Mutual Knowledge 1 where evidence grounds speaker hearer’s belief both understand matter way, assumptions things granted accepting warrants, induction schema recursive formulation Lewis’ (1969) iterative definition knowledge. By formula, interrelated weaker bases mutuality must compensated increasing levels assumption. Marshall’s taxonomy broken three categories: community membership, presence, linguistic co-presence. 2 These types, along associated listed Table I. proceeds assumption listeners each members many different cultural communities (e.g., In later writing (see Clark, was expanded ground, broader notion subsumed belief, knowledge, assumptions, awareness. indirect co-presence fourth category evidence. For ease presentation, condensed categories three.