Auction Mechanism and Methods for Heterogeneous Goods Such as Multiple Polymer Materials

作者: Cong Jun Rao

DOI: 10.4028/WWW.SCIENTIFIC.NET/AEF.6-7.156

关键词:

摘要: Multi-object auctions can be divided into homogeneous goods auction and heterogeneous auction. In this paper, the mechanism methods for such as multiple polymer materials (rubber, plastic, fibre, adhesive, coating) is investigated. Concretely, research history newest trends are introduced, many widespread theoretical applied problems presented. addition, assumptions, main ideas, conclusions of literature related to commented reviewed.

参考文章(16)
Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding Econometrica. ,vol. 50, pp. 1089- 1122 ,(1982) , 10.2307/1911865
Arne Andersson, Jim Wilenius, A New Analysis of Expected Revenue conference on current trends in theory and practice of informatics. pp. 1- 2 ,(2009) , 10.1007/978-3-540-95891-8_1
Jonathan Levin, An Optimal Auction for Complements Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 18, pp. 176- 192 ,(1997) , 10.1006/GAME.1997.0534
Christopher Avery, Terrance Hendershott, Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products The Review of Economic Studies. ,vol. 67, pp. 483- 497 ,(2000) , 10.1111/1467-937X.00140
Thomas R. Palfrey, Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information Econometrica. ,vol. 51, pp. 463- 483 ,(1983) , 10.2307/1912001
Fu-Shiung Hsieh, Combinatorial reverse auction based on revelation of Lagrangian multipliers Decision Support Systems. ,vol. 48, pp. 323- 330 ,(2010) , 10.1016/J.DSS.2009.08.009
Damian S. Damianov, Jörg Oechssler, Johannes Gerd Becker, Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 68, pp. 60- 76 ,(2010) , 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.008
Carolyn Pitchik, Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 66, pp. 928- 949 ,(2009) , 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.10.001