Objects and Structures: Some (Further) Remarks Concerning the Motivation for Ontic Structuralism and its Metaphysical Characterisation

摘要: Elaborating on existing work, this paper discusses so-called ontic structural realism – the view according to which a) we can, and did in past, gain knowledge of structure reality through our best science, b) is all there (or, at least, metaphysically fundamental prior objects). In line with earlier criticisms view, strength of ontic questioned several grounds. first part, it contended that two arguments normally put forward favour one from metaphysical underdetermination, other based alleged priority relations over objects are not persuasive. particular, role played by Principle Identity of the Indiscernibles argument underdetermination discussed some detail, with a view dissolving misunderstandings previous critiques. second is argued that prospects for defining a complete metaphysics dim. either no convincing account ontological available; or, if can be provided, resulting things suffers above mentioned lack motivation.