Labor Regulations, Unions, and Social Protection in Developing Countries: Market Distortions or Efficient Institutions?

摘要: This essay reviews what economists have learned about the impact of labor market institutions, defined broadly as government regulations and union activity on outcomes in developing countries. It finds that: 1) Labor institutions vary greatly among countries but less than they advanced Unions collective bargaining are important while nominally important. 2) Many compliance with minimum wage produce spikes distributions around covered sectors. Most studies find modest adverse effects employment so that raises total income low paid labor. 3) In many wages "spill-over" to unregulated sector, producing there well. 4) Employment protection related laws shift output informal sectors reduce gross mobility. 5) Mandated benefits increase costs modestly others shifted largely labor, some variation 6) Contrary Harris-Todaro two sector model which rural-urban migration adjust a positive relation between unemployment across regions sectors, inversely by "wage curve". 7) affect non-wage well outcomes. 8) Cross-country regressions yield inconclusive results growth country adjustments economic shocks, such balance payments problems, no difference responses strength institutions. 9) institution can be critical when experience great change, China's spurt Argentina's preservation social stability democracy after its 2001-2002 collapse. Cooperative relations tend better 10) The increased share work force world past decades. persistence large throughout world, including high rates growth, puts premium increasing our knowledge how markets finding policies deliver workers sector.