Do the "haves" come out ahead in shanghai courts?

作者: Xin He , Yang Su

DOI: 10.1111/JELS.12005

关键词:

摘要: Drawing on 2,724 documents of adjudication decisions from Shanghai courts, this article tests the Galanter thesis that stronger party tends to prevail over weaker in litigation. We find parties not only win more often, but also do so by a large margin. Overall, institutional litigants fare better than individual litigants. When are classified their organizational and social status, government agencies or governmentrelated companies biggest winners, enjoying an enormous advantage, farmers most disadvantaged underdogs, with other individuals between. controlling for legal representation, these winning gaps remain significant sizable. The edge recurs across categories cases different issue areas law. Echoing previous comparative studies, we cast doubt capability theory. speculate causes judicial inequality China lie resource roots law nature court.

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