An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Networks

作者: Shi Pu , J Joaquin Escudero-Garzás , Alfredo Garcia , Shahin Shahrampour

DOI: 10.1109/TCNS.2020.2964142

关键词:

摘要: We consider the problem of designing an online mechanism for trading divisible resources over a constrained network. In setting, participating agents learn about their marginal valuations gradually time. propose that implements efficient allocation with finite-time guarantee, i.e., upon stopping after $T>0$ rounds, incentive to misreport information has uniform bound is $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$ . illustrate application proposed optimize efficiency in MHA networks , emerging type heterogeneous where users can simultaneously connect several access technologies.

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