Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambiguous effects of oil wealth and oil dependence on violent conflict

摘要: The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis claims that abundance in natural resources, particularly oil, encourages especially civil war. Natural resources provide both motive and opportunity for conflict create indirect institutional economic causes of instability. Contrarily, the theory rentier state — largely neglected study peace war this respect suggests regimes use revenue from abundant to buy off through patronage, large-scale distributive policies effective repression. Consequently, such states would tend be more stable politically less prone conflict. These two theories thus imply ambivalent effects resource on proneness. This article presents part a solution apparent puzzle case oil-producing countries. key argument is wealth per capita dependence need taken into account, since only availability very high revenues oil allows governments achieve internal stability. empirical analysis supports hypothesis. findings multivariate cross-country regressions indicate U-shaped relationship between onset, while tends associated with violence. results macro-qualitative comparison reduced sample highly dependent exporters are even clearcut. Using same sample, we find oil-wealthy countries apparently manage maintain political stability by combination distribution, spending security apparatus protection outsiders. Compared oil-poor contradiction theory, institutions do not seem characterized patronage clientelism.