Uncertainty and international adjudication

摘要: In deciding whether to rule against a state party, international courts regularly confront compliance dilemma: declare the in breach of regime but with risk that it will defy court’s authority; or defer at price acquiescing an unjust undesirable outcome. Specifically, adjudicators must solve this dilemma context uncertainty, is, without knowing exactitude not prefer complying adverse ruling over overt defiance. I use simple strategic model cast light on aspect dilemma. Building off from model’s insights, then discuss practices, doctrinal tactics and institutional mechanisms apt reduce uncertainty minimize highlight, particular, advantages defiance avoidance help create informational feedback loops like test-the-water dicta double-tier review. illustrate how these have been deployed by two world’s most powerful courts, European Court Justice Human Rights. Finally, consider limitations along possibility for other dispute settlement bodies replicate them.