Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation

摘要: Purpose This paper focuses on how the producer inspires his cooperative research partner to reduce carbon emission, by developing a menu of incentive contracts both in and development (R&D) stage recycling stage. Design/methodology/approach The proposed mechanism combines researcher with two-staged closed-loop system. Based concept that takes environmental responsibility, this designs dynamically updating contract for encourage low-carbon efforts. Meanwhile, offers against asymmetric information, is, R&D owns private information capability. According mechanism, decides whether tell truth much effort she would exert stages. Findings Discriminating between different types researchers hurts producer’s profit. But updated screening can inspire is beneficial reducing emissions two stages. The results give optimal solutions mechanism. low-type only obtains reservation profit, whereas high-type given more induce information. Originality/value This proposes strategy factors avoiding adverse selection moral hazard. Considering responsibility waste products, like among partners supply chain.